
Conceptual Function in the Lack of Photomontage Philosophical Representation Gilles Deleuze Perspective

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Abstract

The philosophy of art work in postmodernist view is structuralist, and based on this issue, art cannot be considered as narrator because art as narrator based on structure, is dead art. According to structuralist view, Gilles Deleuze violates any representation in the visual arts. Therefore, by examining Deleuze's point of view, while identifying its lack of representation and explanation in photomontage, also explains the function of concepts in this field. The function of concepts in non-representation is only in the failure of the organizational structure and the creation of non-narrative works. The main question is what role does the concepts play in the lack of philosophical representation in photomontage? It has been assumed that concepts have a movement-oriented and creative role with the principle of being in photomontage. In conclusion, Deleuze, by violating narrative and being in the art of photography, considers photomontage to be a creative movement in fluidity that takes up time and space. The research method is done through library.

Keywords: Concept; Lack of Representation; Photomontage; Deleuze; Photograph

1. Introduction

By considering representation as classic and support it to the thinking of centuries-old philosophers, we find that truth is part of what we perceive in our perceptions. If this is an absolute

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thing, cannot be ignored because it is a principle and philosophy is the science of principles. But art is more than representation because it can be integrated as the meanings of the past and absolute. Self-awareness shows us that a book is smaller than a table which is rationally true, and representation emphasizes the same thing, but when in the art of photomontage one can be influenced by the external truth, a book placed next to the table and exhibits a real table smaller than a real book, then the structure is broken and the mind is confronted with a new form of image. In fact, by breaking the structure and violation in art, it can be injected by time and movement, especially in the visual arts such as photography. But, what this really means, or how it can be called as non-representation, is complex and an attempt is made to simplify, through the help of Gilles Deleuze thoughts, a postmodern philosopher. Non-representation begins with deconstruction in the postmodern perspective, when the truth can be represented in a different way by means of art. Old structures are broken and the image as a modern symbol changes the intuitive image of the mind and new concepts are formed. But in general, the failure of the structure leads to the creation of new concepts, although the philosophers emphasized by Gilles Deleuze have been insistent on the essence of the substance and have used the adjective with it. But Deleuze, by measuring this issue in art, emphasizes the lack of representation. In the visual arts in particular, Deleuze has had the most views on photomontage and lack of representation, which will be explained in this article.

1.1. Function of Common Concepts in Combinable Montage

The formation of a common concept is the first step of a moral act. However, this notion of the production of common concepts is not yet accurate enough to be implemented. Deleuze says we must distinguish between more general common concepts, and less common concepts. The most common concepts are those that bear a resemblance from a very general point of view: they can at most include what is common to all bodies, such as dimension, motion, and stillness. However, these very common concepts are exactly the ones that benefit us the least. On the other hand, the less common concepts are in fact the ones that immediately benefit us the most. These concepts create a similar combination between two bodies that directly agree on their local position. Just as we have constantly descended within the internal structure of power, here too we must descend to the lowest and most local level of commonality to begin our practical project. "Through such concepts we understand the agreements between states. They go beyond the external perception of the agreements seen at random in order to find an internal and necessary reason for the agreement of the bodies in the similarity of composition." Thus, especially in the most special cases, we see that the common concept finds internal logic, and the common concept covers and explains its cause, or in other words, the common concept is a complete idea: "Common concepts are general and absolute necessity; "In other words, common concepts are ideas that are formally explained by the power of our thinking, and materially express or manifest the idea of God as the actual cause." The common concept gives us a tool with which we can create a complete picture of ourselves. The first Tommy idea can identify something in common between two bodies. This idea immediately leads to another idea. This way, we can start activating our builder project. However, Deleuze has not yet been persuaded that we have put this initial moment into practice as it should be: "Therefore, there is a danger that a common concept may emerge to intervene like a miracle, unless we explain how we shape it ... Exactly how and under what conditions do we make (common concepts) desirable? "How do we achieve the power of our action?" Deleuze warns that when we look at Spinoza's theory of common concepts, we must avoid two dangerous misinterpretations. The first mistake about common concepts is to "highlight their mathematical meaning, and ignore their biological meaning." In other words, we must remember that common concepts refer primarily

to the physics of bodies, not to the logic of thought: it is better to think of them as arising from Hobbesian material realm, not the Cartesian mathematical world. The second misinterpretation we may make about common concepts is "Highlighting their theoretical theme and disregarding their practical function" (Hart and Deleuze, 2013: 180). When common concepts were first introduced in the second part of the book *Ethics*, they were presented precisely from a theoretical point of view in their logical order. In this theoretical design, common concepts go from the highest degree of generality (motion, stillness, etc.) to the lowest degree of generality. The practical development of common concepts in the fifth section of *ethics* is exactly the opposite: from the lowest degree of generality (the specific proportional relationship between two bodies) to the highest degree of generality. Common concepts are not essentially a theoretical form of analysis, but a kind of practical tool. Here, to begin practical progress, we can assume that we are experiencing a proportionate encounter by chance. We can have a correct idea of the famous epistemological beginning of Spinoza's understanding; Or we have at least one correct idea) to move to the realm of bodies and interactions. We have at least one joyful passive effect. This experience of happiness is the spark that drives moral progress: "When we encounter a body that agrees with our body, when we experience a joyful passive theater, we are encouraged to imagine something in common between that body and our body." The process begins with the experience of happiness. This random encounter with a compatible body allows or encourages us to identify a common relationship and build a common concept. However, there are two processes in this path that Deleuze insists should be considered separately. In the first moment, we try to avoid sad passions, because the power of action and the accumulation of joyful passions ruin us. This choice increases our power, but never brings it to the point of activation: joyful passions are always the result of an external cause, and always imply an incomplete idea. Therefore, with the help of sad passions, we must build what is common between the external body and our own body. "Because this very idea alone, this common concept, is complete." The first moment, the accumulation of joyful passions, provides the conditions for this leap of complete imagination. According to Deleuze, the common concepts of "ontological rupture" form Spinoza's thought and represent the completion of the transition from theory to action. "Common concepts are one of the discoveries of the book of *ethics*" (Spinoza, 1985: 292).

1.2. Concepts in the Existence of being and how it actually works

Man is able to blow designs and go beyond his own design and situation to finally express the creative nature, but the description of this human freedom and creativity is not clear. Of course, society is based on human intelligence, but Deleuze points out that there is no direct movement between intelligence and society. Instead, society is more directly the result of "irrational factors." Deleuze considers "potential instinct" and "the function of mythology" to be the forces that lead to the creation of tasks and gods. However, these forces cannot justify the human forces of creativity. For the solution, we must return to the analysis of the gap between human intelligence and socialization. "What appears in the distance between intelligence and society ...? The answer is not intuition" (Hart and Deleuze, 2013: 41). Intuition is the "explosive inner force that is in the heart of life" and we have already referred to it as the positive dynamics of existence. Here, however, the concept is more clearly completed. More precisely, Deleuze immediately adds that what fills this gap between intelligence and sociability is the source of intuition, and the source of intuition is creative excitement. This original production of socialization through creative excitement takes us back to Bergson's "scope of unity in memory," but this time it is a new memory. "And this creative excitement is nothing more than a cosmic memory that actualizes all levels at the same time and

frees man from the scope or surface he has to make him a creator or creator in accordance with the whole movement of creation" (Deleuze, 1988: 111 (with slight modification). With cosmic memory, Deleuze arrives at the mystical Bergsonian socialization that exists for "privileged souls" and is able to depict the design of an open society or a society of creators.

2. Explaining the Function of the Concept in the matter of Repetition to Problem

Existence means what is and what is true, but it can escape from reality in what we mix with art, and by not representing it, it can abandon narration and all concepts can leave the organized structure. Can nature be anything other than what it is in art? This is shown to us by postmodern postmodernist philosophy. If there is a change, it must be felt in the concept and understood in the experience, but the art and philosophy of postmodernism considers the experience to be right when it is productive of movement. How does thought, and mental activity in general, emerge in the universe, and how thought create the internal structures that are sufficient and appropriate to understand potential and form evolution? In introducing her theory of mind, Deleuze uses the philosophical concept of "repetition" as a guiding clue. He discusses four theories of repetition - the theories of Hume, Bergson, Freud, and Nietzsche -: the repetition of habit (Hume), the repetition of memory (Bergson), the forced repetition (Freud), and the metaphysical theory of the universe as A movement in the field of "eternal repetition" proposed by Nietzsche. These theories of repetition have in common that repetition in each case involves a process similar to or associated with mental activity. Combining activity is necessary for any observer to note that the sun is rising again today (habit). Philosophy must both understand how the mind works in the natural and pragmatic realms, and be able to go beyond it when it seeks to understand the order of reality, of which the mind is a part. "Creative Evolution," Bergson says: "But these difficulties and contradictions of theoretical philosophy all stem from the attempt to apply the usual forms of our thought to subjects with which our industry has nothing to do, and therefore our dough has not been formed in their form." (Bergson, 1960: 113). In Deleuze's view, "our natural industry appears in the beginning as a very primitive regular activity, that is, with a combination of imagination in which the two repetitive motion poles are united by that activity alone." The body currently performs such compositional and imaginative actions that it can combine and integrate sensory perceptions and recognize them when they are repeated. The mind, in this early stage of development, derives its pleasure from its activity and from the feelings which bind them together in the present life of its present, now that its foundation is based on the continuation of the habits of the body itself. Thus, this stage constitutes the main level of mental life that is based on narcissism. If we now take a step back and consider Deleuze's philosophical approach to developing a theory of mental activity, we can see that the concept of repetition performs two different strategic tasks, both of which are related to the very fundamental and established issues of the new philosophy. Another problem addressed by the concept of repetition is related to the first problem, but its metaphysical aspect is less; This is not about the relationship between mind and body, but about the relationship between consciousness and the world, that is, between the "cognitive agent" (subject) and the "subject of cognition" (object). The strategic advantage and great importance of the concept of repetition is that it links the development of mental activity and cognitive ability apart from any intentional relationship with the issues of identification. If there is a repetitive "subject", it is not transcendental (or super-empirical): It is not the central nucleus for the representation corresponding to the arbitration system that determines the subjects of identification in the empirical world (Dave and Deleuze, 2016: 72). This motivation to separate mental activity, thought, and language from "intention" is one of the enduring themes in Deleuze's early philosophy. This motivation is weakened and shaken

in the books of *Anti-Deepus* and *the Thousand Plateaus* by the concepts of machine and underground stem, which imply a kind of relationship between thought and the world, but in Deleuze's later works, in his books about Leibniz and about Cinema is re-emerging. It can be said that Bergson is, in Deleuze's view, the embodiment of idealistic temptations, that is, the temptation of mental idealism, which equates endurance with the realm of mental activity. "Materialist Guatari" weakened this attraction, but in recent writings about Leibniz and cinema she has returned in an artistic and aesthetic form. What is the philosophy behind the new creation? Except for the diversity of the truth? Creation itself is a lack of representation of nature because creation in today's philosophy means breaking structure. In new creations, art seeks to create concepts that are unstructured, time-consuming, and non-representational, just as an apple can be imagined larger than a house and depicted to the mind is confronted with its objective representation in an inverted representation and time finds its meaning in the whole image and is not just a concept of being.

2.1. Function of Concepts in Ideas from Imagination to Image

Reality, as a connection according to the laws, is the same as the continuous connection of actualities, and unreality, as what appears suddenly and discontinuously on consciousness, is a latitude in the process of actualization. As a result, there is another pair of terms: true and false. The real and the unreal are always different, but the distinction itself is not always distinguishable: when the distinction between the real and the unreal becomes indistinguishable, you have a lie. But for this reason, where there is falsehood, truth itself becomes indistinguishable. Lying is not a mistake or a mistake, but a power that makes truth uncertain and indecisive. Imagination is a very complex idea, because it represents the common denominator of these two pairs of terms. The imaginary is not the unreal, but the indistinguishable between the real and the unreal. These two terms are not interchangeable, but they remain distinct from each other, but the distinction between them is constantly changing. This distinction manifests itself well in three different aspects of the crystallization phenomenon: An exchange between an actual image? And there is a latent image, the latent becomes actual and vice versa; There is also an exchange between light and opaque, opaque becomes clear and vice versa. Finally, there is the exchange between seed and environment. I think the imaginary thing is this set of exchanges. Imagination is the same as the image - crystal. Imagination is an important factor in modern cinema. We find it in very different forms in Ophelia, Renoir, Fellini, Visconti, Tarkovsky, Zanussi, and so on. I do not believe that fantasy is special at all, but it exists in the system of images: a system that can be called organic belongs to the image of motion, which is based on rational continuities and itself provides a model of the truth of the whole (Deleuze, 2013: 48). And then, a crystalline system, belonging to the image-time, which is based on irrational slices with mere reconnections and replaces the pattern of truth with the power of falsehood. Cinema - precisely because it moves images - has its own resources to address this issue (i.e., the issue of two different image systems). But we also find these systems elsewhere, which have received help from other sources: Weringer? It had long before shown a confrontation in art between a "classical" organic system and an inorganic or crystalline system, so that the second system has no less vital force than the first system, but is a Gothic or barbaric life. These are two stylistic forms, and one cannot be said to be "more honest" than the other, because truth as a pattern or as an idea relates to only one of these two systems. Perhaps the concept or philosophy also takes these two different forms. In Nietzsche we see a philosophical discourse that collapses into a crystalline system, replacing power instead of a pattern of truth, inorganic life instead of guidelines for the acquisition of knowledge, and shameless re-linking (choice of items) instead. Makes logical connections. What Weringer calls expressionism (expressionism) is a good way to approach

inorganic life, which is fully developed in cinema and cannot be adequately explained in terms of the imaginary. But Expressionism is only one approach, and by no means does it end the crystalline system, but emerges in various forms, in other art forms, and in cinema itself.

3. Interpreting Issue of Burnout in Deconstruction and Lack of Representation

Burnout due to the erosion of a priori beliefs and long steps towards combining new concepts in order to create a new image and spread lack of representation alongside the conscious mind is something that can be defined from a postmodernist point of view as burnout due to the collision of old structures. In this regard, one can rely on Deleuze's own writings, which proceed with a staged thought process. Our implications of Deleuze's expression are that ethics presents three elements that are not just content but also forms of expression: media or effects (emotions): ideas or concepts; Essences or perceptions. These three elements correspond to three types of cognition, which are also states of existence and states of expression. A sign for Spinoza can have several meanings, but it is always an effect or a defect. One effect is first of all the rejection of one body on another body, that is, the state of one body to the extent that it tolerates another bodily action: "An effect (affectio) is an effect, like the effect of the sun on our body, which 'indicates' the nature of the affected body and includes only the nature of the affecting body." We know our effect by our ideas, senses or perceptions, senses of heat, senses of color, senses of form, and senses of distance (the sun is high, a golden disk, two hundred feet inverter). For convenience, we call impressions graded signs, because they express our situation in an instant, and are distinguished from other types of signs: Because our current situation is always a slice of our past, and under this heading increases or decreases, expands or limits our existence compared to the previous situation (no matter how close) in Durand. We do not compare the two states in a reflection operation, but determine each state from the effector to a "more" or a "less": the heat of the sun overwhelms me, or, conversely, its heat repels me. So, the effect is not only the immediate effect of a body on my body, but also on my past - a pleasure or a pain, a joy or a sorrow. They are transitions, ups and downs, continuous fluctuations of power that go from one state to another. We call these effects which, to be more precise, are no longer effects. They are signs of increase and decrease, vector signs of the happy type, and are no longer graded like impressions, sensations, or perceptions (Deleuze, 2013: 282). There are six or seven types of signs that combine seamlessly. In particular, graduated signs are necessarily combined with vector signs. Impacts always assume the effects from which those effects are derived, although they are not reduced. Associativity, variability, and ambiguity or analogy are common to all of these symptoms. Impacts vary depending on the chains of association between the bodies. The sun hardens the flower and loosens the wax, the horse has no meaning for the warrior and the peasant. Moral effects themselves change depending on the people, each person responds to them with her imagination. An incomprehensible or multi-conceptual problem goes back to the essence of meaning in the mind of each of us, and our mind is able to understand the world through its own comprehensibility. "The most incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is understandable" (Heaton, 2017: 57) As far as interpretations are concerned, they are fundamentally multi-meaningful, based on the association of a variable between a given data and something not given. It is a polytheistic or analogical deity that lends infinite understanding and will to God, to the magnified image of our understanding and our will: There is the same ambiguity between the dog as a barking animal and the dog as a constellation. Signs are like conventional words because they act on natural signs and only categorize their variability and ambiguity: Conventional signs are abstractions that establish a relative constancy for the variable chains of association. The natural contractual distinction for signs is therefore no more decisive than the

distinction of the social state of the natural state; Even vector signs can rely on contracts, such as rewards (increase) and penalties (decrease). Vector signs, that is, effects, are usually entered into variable associations as much as effects: What causes a part of the body to grow can reduce the other part, what is a slave for one part is an ability for the other part, and following a peak can be a depression, and vice versa. Understanding the issue of non-representation goes back to our understanding of new objects that are made by the conscious mind and at the same time are reflected in postmodern art that seeks to break down old structures.

4. Concepts and Lack of Representation in Expressive Attributes and formal Distinction

If we consider attributes from Deleuze's point of view in an understanding of Spinoza's philosophy, in fact, what is in the mind also becomes a descriptor with the perception of attributes, so representation is suspended because we do not see the image of existence with the essence of existence, but with everything that exists. Deleuze takes a simple chain of theological paradigms to give an image of Spinoza's theory of manifesting or expressive traits. Negative theologies generally state that God is the cause of the universe, but they do not consider the essence of the universe to be the essence of God. In other words, although the world is a kind of expression or manifestation of God, the essence of God always goes beyond the essence of its expression or manifestation and seeks excellence: "What is covered, it also reveals, but what it reveals remains hidden" (Deleuze, 1968: 63). Manifestations cannot be received in any other way, i.e., accepted into empirical (sensory) consciousness, except through the combination of plurals, through which representations of a certain place or a certain time are produced. That is, through the combination of congruent things and through the consciousness of the combined unity of these (congruent) multitudes. Now, awareness of congruent multitudes in general intuition, as far as the representation of an object is possible through it, forms the concept of a quantity (quantity). Therefore, even the perception of an object, as an appearance, is only possible through the unity of the combination of multiples of a given sensory intuition, through which the unity of the combination of homogeneous multiples is conceived in the concept of a quantity; That is, the phenomena are all quantities, and of course the quantities are continuous, because the phenomena as intuitions in space or in time, must be able to be represented through the same combination, through which space and time are generally determined (Lash, 2014: 250). Appearances are not objects per se. Experimental [sensory] intuition is possible only through pure intuition (intuition of place and intuition of time); Therefore, whatever geometry dictates about pure intuition is undoubtedly valid about empirical (sensory) intuition. And these unwarranted excuses must be abandoned that the objects of the senses cannot conform to the rules of building [forms] in space (for example, the rules of infinite divisibility of lines or angles). Because in that case, man denies the objective validity of space and at the same time the objective validity of all mathematics, and he no longer knows why and to what extent mathematics can be applied to phenomena. The combination of places and times, as the inherent forms of any kind of intuition, is what it receives at the same time, and as a result makes possible any kind of external experience, and then also any kind of recognition of the objects of external experience; And what mathematics, in its pure application, proves about perception, is necessarily valid about the objects of cognition. Any objection to this approach is the language of the sophisticated games of an ill-trained intellect; An intellect which mistakenly indulges in the delusion that it frees the objects of the senses from the formal condition of our sensibility, and represents these objects, though they are nothing but appearances, as if they were understood as objects in themselves. In this case, of course, from these objects of the senses a priori nothing can be known

compositely, and consequently nothing can be known compositely through the pure concepts of place, and the science which determines these concepts. Slowly, that is, geometry, itself will not be possible (Lash, 2014: 252). Salma, Gilles Deleuze's point of view has many differences with Kant, because the passage of philosophy from modernism to postmodernism leads to the failure of the structure, and the true representation as it is in the opinion of the old philosophers does not appear in today's art, and the result is a photo and understanding with new concepts. Innovation and technology face each other. It is in this chapter that Gilles Deleuze sees montage as a part of the ineffectiveness of the previous concept and analyzes movement, time and space in it in a post-structuralist way. The distinction between expression and allegory becomes clearer when Deleuze distinguishes attributes from properties. "Characteristics are not adjectives in the strict sense of the word, precisely because they are not expressive or demonstrative (Deleuze, 1968: 50). Attributes are concepts that affect us and cannot help us understand nature, because they do not provide us with a common form. Therefore, Deleuze distinguishes between two meanings of "God's word": one refers to the attribute as an expression or manifestation, and the other refers to the property as a sign: "A sign is always attached to a property; A sign always implies a commandment, and forms the basis of our obedience. Expression or manifestation is always related to an attribute; It is the expression or manifestation of an essence, i.e., nature in the infinite matter; It makes the expression or manifestation of essence or nature understandable for us. Once again, the expression or manifestation of attributes can only take place through the common forms of existence. This view can be presented from two dimensions: on the one hand, due to the attributes, God is absolutely hidden within the universe of states (he is fully self or manifest); and on the other hand, due to the common forms of the attributes, the states are completely in the divine essence. Innerness and interference are two ways of expression or manifestation of attributes. It is this involvement that makes a distinction between the understanding resulting from expressive or manifesting attributes, and the prescribed obedience with similar properties. The system of signs does not tell us anything about existence; Consonant signs and rules of semiotics reject ontology. It is only expression or manifestation that can enable our knowledge of existence (Hart and Deleuze, 2013: 128). In fact, Deleuze considers the first two major steps of Spinoza's philosophical system, that is, the description of essence and attributes, to be a kind of alternative logic of speculation; Not in opposition to the Hegelian development, but quite independently of it. This conceptual independence shows how Spinoza represents a turning point in the evolution of Deleuze's philosophical work, and also shows how Deleuze's interpretation is revolutionary in Spinoza studies that have been dominated by Hegelian readings for many years in continental philosophy. In reading Deleuze's interpretation of Nietzsche, we said that Deleuze frees her own thinking from the dialectical realm through the theory of full-fledged critique. This process is completed in Spinoza's interpretation. Moreover, although Hegel is not mentioned at all throughout his text, we can easily make a comparison with Hegelian ontology to show the important conceptual independence of the basis of Deleuze's Spinozism. In fact, Hegel's own interpretation and critique of Spinozian ontology highlights the differences in Deleuze's work; From a Hegelian point of view, we will be able to recognize the radical break based on Deleuze's reading of the unity of essence and the monotony of attributes in Spinoza's philosophy.

4.1. Composition and Concepts from Chaos to Non-Representation of Montage

The growth of fantasy in the mind continues until the structure of reality in the universe breaks down in the mind and chaos leads to a new result in such a way that the representation of a ridiculous idea is in the mind. It is possible to take a picture from the aspect of self-awareness and

by mixing everything that is self-aware to create something new that needs a new attribute. What kind of idea can representationalism be and when does the mind want an idea beyond the universe? Even the smallest causality remains rare without this subjective element. Every organ is not a brain and every life is not organ-like, but there are forces everywhere that create micro-brains or non-organ-like life of things. Vitalism has always been possible in interpretation: the first interpretation refers to an idea that acts but is not, which therefore acts only from the perspective of external mental cognition (from Kant-Taclaud Bernard); And the second interpretation implies a force that exists but does not act, and therefore it is a kind of pure inner feeling (from Leibniz to Ruyeh). If it seems that the second interpretation is binding for us, the reason is that the contraction of the holder is always in a state of withdrawal from action or even from movement, and presents itself as a pure contemplation devoid of cognition. This is even in Mia. It can be seen at the highest level of the brain of habituation or the formation of habits: Although everything seems to occur from one test to the next according to progressive and active connections and integrations, it is necessary, as Hume shows, that the tests or cases, as well as events, in an "imagination" become contemplative, while still remaining distinct from actions and knowledge; And even when the party is a mouse, it is through meditation that makes a habit "contracted" and "complicated". With all these words, it is still necessary to discover this sense of inner creative data or the silent meditations that testify to the brain under the noise of actions (Deleuze, Guthari, 2016: 284). The two aspects or layers of the core of the subject, the sense of the concept, are very fragile and fragile. These two are not merely objective dissociations and dissociations, but rather a limitless fatigue that leads to a sense of data that is now disturbed and allows the escape of elements and vibrations that find it increasingly difficult to contract. Aging is fatigue: therefore, aging is either a fall into the mental chaos, out of the layout of the composition page, or a return to ready-made voices, clichés that imply what the artist no longer has anything to say about, art. A mind that no longer has the ability to create the sense of new data and no longer knows how to store, meditate and contract. The case of philosophy is somewhat different. However, philosophy also depends on a similar fatigue. But this time about the philosophy of tired thought, which does not have the ability to maintain itself on the plan of the internal plane, it can no longer handle the infinite speeds of the third type, which, in the manner of an abyss or a vortex, is simultaneously present and simultaneous with the concept and all its components. They measure its strength component (coherence) and endure, the tired thought returns to relative speeds, which are only related to the sequence of movement from one point to another, from one constituent part of an effort to another, and from one idea to another idea, and without the ability to reconstruct any concept, simple associations [= they measure and measure the simple. Undoubtedly, these relative velocities may be very large, to the extent that they simulate the absolute; But they are nothing but variable speeds of vote, discussion or "present answers", as we see with tireless young people whose agility of mind we admire. And also, with the tired old people who follow the documented votes and get involved in stagnant discussions by talking in pure solitude and inside their hollow heads. Like a distant memory of their old concepts that are still hanging on them so as not to be completely overthrown in the depths of Chaos. The operators themselves are layers of the brain that draw the variable coordinates of a kind of recognition (reference) plane design and send partial observers anywhere (Deleuze, Guattari, 2016: 286). Variables die continuously without reviving, and this causes the brain to turn into a series of small deaths, which puts permanent death inside us. This invokes a power that undoubtedly operates not only in determinable bonds that result from perceptions, but more so in the freedom that changes according to the creation of concepts, sense data, or the operators themselves. The internal philosophy page design, art composition page design, reference page design with the coordination

of science; The form of the concept, the power of feeling, the operator of knowledge: Concepts and conceptual characters, sensory data and visuals, operators and partial observers. Similar issues are raised for each page design: in what sense and how is the page design, in each of the three cases, single or plural, and which is unity and which is plural? But the most important issues that seem to us now are the issues related to the interference between the plans of the pages that join together in the brain. The first type of interference appears when a philosopher tries to create the concept of a datum or an operator (for example, a concept specific to Riemannian space or specific to dumb numbers). Or when a scientist is trying to create operators of the sense of data, like Fechner or in the theories of color or sound, and even the creation of operators of concepts, as shown by Albert Lutman regarding mathematics as far as virtual concepts are actualized; Or when an artist makes a sense of the pure data of concepts or operators, as we see in various types of abstract art or in Leh. In all these cases, the rule is that the intervening field must act with its own methods. For example, it is possible to talk about the inherent beauty of a geometric shape, a kind of function or a kind of proof, but this beauty will not have beauty or aesthetic quality as long as it is according to the criteria borrowed from science such as proportion, symmetry, asymmetry, projection, or transformation, is defined as: This is what Kant has demonstrated with all his might. Concepts and conceptual characters are removed from the inner manic screen plan that corresponds to them to slide on another screen plan, between operators and partial observers, or between Hassads and Hassani's pictures: The same situation is true in other cases. These slips are very subtle, like Zarathustra's slip in Nietzsche's philosophy or Igiton's slip in Mallarmé's poetry - so that we find ourselves on the design of complex and composite pages that are not easily described. Partial observers, in their turn, introduce a receptive sense to science, which sometimes resembles Hassani's paintings on a mixed page design (Gutari and Deleuze, 2016: 289). Can it be said that by combining philosophy and art, the concept can be transformed into the unintelligible and the unintelligible into the concept? Nothing can be understood before entering a mind, so if it is not understood after receiving the mind, what can be understood with a non-mental concept? So, philosophy can turn the incomprehensible into a concept, but art can do the opposite so that everything that has a concept in the mind becomes an incomprehensible? That is, until the representation of the mind is faced with nothing. The reflection of concepts in the mind is a function of the surrounding nature, but the reflection of the same concepts to nature can not be the primary concept, because the attribution in the mind is different from what is in nature, so can it not be said that the representation of the event is not the subject? The design of the white page, on which spots are imprinted in the mind, and the thought sprinkles color on it, and the concept comes to a conclusion? Can't it be said that everything is meaningless before sitting on the screen design? Representing nonsense is just a ridiculous idea. Is it not possible to say that everything that comes out of the mind is completely non-representation of even a photomontage photo that the photographer makes with her mental plan.

4.2. Function of new Concepts and Non-Representation in Upside-down Image

Our mental image of a specific problem is such that only we ourselves have achieved it with our mental characteristics. For example, my individual view of truth is such that it should exist, and the world is empty of truth, but from a poet's point of view, truth is something that can show another truth by changing the dimensions of the world through words. Nature is an undeniable truth, but do all human beings have the same perception of nature? Perception is formed through language and concepts and thought nurtures it, but how much can the cultivation of such a thing be measured by pure reason? But these relatively real issues of philosophy are meaningless for Deleuze because she

believed in the existence of forces in time and the movement of forces in art, and any solid structure for Deleuze was nothing but an outdated concept. Relying on the views of philosophers such as Nietzsche, Deleuze pays attention to the origin of the mind and everything that is a change of forces, to actions and reactions and what can be changed, or at least this is our perception, and not all perceptions can be considered the same. In fact, "in the origin, there is a difference between active and reactive forces. The relationship of action and reaction is not the relationship of sequence, but the relationship of being together in the origin itself. In addition, the association of action forces and confirmation and association of reactive and negation forces were obtained with the principle that negation is placed in advance and completely on the side of reaction. On the contrary, it is only action forces that affirm themselves and confirm their difference and turn this difference into an object for pleasure and approval. The reactive force, even when it commands, restricts the active force, imposes restrictions and restrictions and is controlled in advance by the spirit of negation (Nietzsche, 2013: 11). This is why the origin itself, in a sense, has its own inverted image, if we look at it from the side of reactive forces, the differentiating and genealogical element appears upside down, the difference becomes negation and confirmation, a contradiction. An inverted image of the origin always accompanies the origin; "Yes" in the perspective of reactive forces becomes "No" in the perspective of reactive forces, and self-affirmation is changed into another's negation. Action forces are original, but they find themselves against a popular image that is reflected in reaction forces. Genealogy is the art of difference or distinction, the art of originality; But he sees himself upside down in the mirror of reactive forces. In this way, his/her image appears as an image of an "evolution". Sometimes this evolution is understood in the German way, as a dialectical and Hegelian evolution and as the formation of a contradiction, and sometimes in the English way and as a derivation of believable benefit and the formation of profit and benefit. But true genealogy is always caricatured in the essentially reactionary image that evolution presents. The evolution of belief, whether English or German, is a reactionary picture of genealogy. So, it is the characteristic of reactionary forces to deny the difference that made them from the beginning. They invert the element of differentiation from which they have diverged and present a distorted image of it "Heterogeneity breeds hatred" (Nietzsche, 2010: 263). This is why they do not perceive themselves as a force and prefer to turn against themselves instead of understanding themselves in this way and accepting differences. The "commonness" of thought shows the madness of interpreting and evaluating phenomena in the form of reactive forces, from which each nation chooses itself. But the origin of this madness, from the very beginning, is in the upside-down image. Consciousness and conscience are only magnifications of this inverted image (Deleuze, 2013: 95). If we go to the mind's interpretation of the concepts with these words and say that the mind seeks something higher than representation by escaping from fatigue, and the mind itself is a world that makes a big bang in itself to create another world, what can be represented and what Can something be considered non-representation? This kind of thing only happens with an artistic and poetic vision when we make the sky fly with words or the moon seems bigger than the sky with a picture. In fact, the action and reaction completely depend on the mind, because everything that goes into the mind comes out with another manifestation. As a photographer depicts a polar bear in a glass by creating a photomontage photo. Both are real, both the glass and the bear, but what made two real existences together to form an unreal concept? Is there anything other than the principle of non-representation that happens in art?

5. Lack of Representation in Photomontage photos and Function of Fluid Concept in Creation



Fig 1 Photo representing time and movement

Deleuze believed that art is alive, and in his opinion, whatever is in the image and photography that evokes and narrates the past is not alive and cannot be called art. By violating representation, Deleuze seeks the continuity of force and movement in art. The above photo contains time and movement by disrupting the rule of being. The image can be anything other than what Fahime already has in her possession, so that a concept includes several concepts at the same time and creates an image outside the mind that is far from representation. Creation in the photo can change our mental image of a specific thing that we have believed in all our lives or break its structure in our mind. If such an event occurs, the non-representation of its objective concept will be found, like what we see in the above picture. Destructuring or overthrowing the pre-determined structure of the mind through experience is something that postmodern philosophy establishes with the combination of art and creates a new perspective in the mind. If we want to scrutinize the problem with Deleuze's mentality and its analysis on the previous works, we should pay attention to everything in a photograph based on its impression from the surrounding world and its non-representation when returning to the world with another appearance. About Bacon's paintings, Deleuze has drawn such a world many times. This is a case where, one might say, the "common hallucination of crazy images" is compressed into a "situational hysteria". This "situational hysteria" preserves the only necessary totality that, following Sartre's sharp critique, is still possible for the phenomenological method: that of the spontaneity that defines consciousness as a form of creation. Since the photo excites the viewer, Bacon uses the variety of situations provided by the photos to enliven his paintings through the effect of "companion". The photograph is determined, creating the viewer's sense of individuality, even if it is a spontaneous individuality that is different from the sense of consciousness that creates it. However, Barthes's interpretation is not in complete agreement with the passage referred to in Sartre's "Imagination". But it is necessary to emphasize the fact that what distinguishes different kinds of situations is the theoretical property of intention, and not the presence or absence of an object... If I look at a picture in a magazine, they are very easily They can have nothing to say to me." Which means that I look at them without the certain assumption of their existence. It is possible that someone will find cases in which the photo leaves

me in such a state of indifference that no impression is created in me. "The photograph is vaguely established as an object, and the people it describes as people indeed, but only because of their resemblance to humans, without any particular intention. They float between the edges of perception, sign, and image, without touching any of them (Morton and Deleuze, 2013: 37). The disintegration of the world is not far-fetched in the minds of today's technologists. The interweaving of different concepts in the above photo, which represents two concepts of today's world that are cast in an artistic format and what we find in a certain time, is the non-representation of what nature is. Photomontage basically belongs more to the world of nature than art. (Soulage, 2019: 328)



Fig 2 Visual concept

What changes the nature of a visible concept and what does the change include in the concept? Art can be our answer and this problem appears when some contradictory adjectives and some concepts with a certain paradox form a single meaning together and break the representation. The previous drawing of the mind due to empiricism can change with an artistic event into two halves before the event and after the event, and with the discovery of a new connection in the conscious mind, the result will be non-representation. By understanding the issue of being and being away from being, Deleuze tries to make the art of imaging, especially the photograph, with potential and injects becoming into it, so that whatever work is created, its creation continues with the audience's feelings without reaching the static matter. In fact, the lack of representation represents the flow of feeling in the art of photography and it lack focus on the past time. In fact, a photograph is a living art that always has time and movement in it. Therefore, Deleuze's escape from the structure of the photograph is where she considers feeling as its main thing and negates any organization in it. Basically, the subject is not organized and static, but fluid and variable. Transcendental empiricism liberates thought from any ultimate metaphysical foundation by insisting that life is not an actual field but a potential multiplicity (Ardalani, 2017: 39). Relying on this issue, photomontage in

photography can be seen as a proof of the principle of fluidity and transformation from Deleuze's point of view.



Fig 3 Photomontage in mind of photographer

The mind's perception of the concepts is a heterogeneous interpretation of the world, which each mind considers a meaning for itself from that world. For example, making a design of a photomontage in the mind of a photographer in order not to represent objects, (as Deleuze did in a discussion from wear and tear to structural change (Deleuze, 2016: 283 onwards), means something that changes the image of the surrounding world and what reaches the field of emergence is a different effect of the surrounding world and it cannot be called a representation anymore. It means preserving forces, time and movement in the image, which according to Deleuze Demomet in the flow and aliveness of art in space.

6. Conclusion

Movement and being in time must be maintained. By avoiding representation, this will happen if the habit is avoided. It is in such a situation that your transformation is continuous. Photomontage in photography is to move away from the space of representation and keep alive the creation in motion and being alive. The flow of chaos should originate from feeling and be in conflict with representation because it is in this way that the true meaning of art is transferred to photography. The creation of a work in photography is far from representation, which does something beyond narration, and in photomontage photos, time becomes active and immortal and does not evoke the past. With such a description, one can reach the death of the concept in a moment and achieve the transformation of the concept in every creation. When functions become non-representational, its effects are infinite and have existence. If creation in a work of art always continues even after the death of the author and continues with the audience's feelings, it means that the organization will be completely disintegrated and we will face a lack of representation every time. This is the same thing that I took from Deleuze and it is the same thing that she refers to in expressing order in disorder. If we consider the photo to be, it means something that remains in the past and its permanence is only in the past and it is a narrator. But if we consider the photo in the photomontage as the creator of the forces and the stimulus of feeling in every piece of time, then the photo has its own form and

lack of representation finds meaning in it. Concepts in the creation of artwork have a form that Deleuze defines their role in forces and body with disorganization.

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